New Zealand’s democracy, Te Tiriti and the Marine and Coastal Area Act

New Zealand is a democracy that is being challenged by race and tribal-based activism. A democracy implies universal suffrage, one person/one vote, votes being of equal value, the rule of law, and an open and educated society with freedom of speech.

New Zealand is still a well-functioning democracy compared, for example, with the United States.  However, voters are not all treated equally.  The Canterbury Regional Council (Ngāi Tahu Representation) Act 2022 empowers Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu to appoint up to two members of the Environment Canterbury Council with full decision-making powers.  These members are unelected appointees.  This sets an undemocratic precedent for the future.

Most New Zealanders seek better socio-economic outcomes for Māori.  This would strengthen not weaken our democracy.   However, the challenge to democracy is largely ideological and power-driven, not focused on socio-economic outcomes nor enlightened by economic reasoning.  Activists seek greater respect for Māori culture and sharper distinctiveness from non-Māori culture through language, tikanga and “ways of knowing”.                                                              

Activists claim that Te Tiriti is an equal partnership between the British Crown and Māori tribes. They also contend that Te Tiriti states principles. These misunderstandings are pervasive and often have financial implications. 

For example, one of the obligatory requirements for media access to the $55M Public Interest Journalism Fund was to actively “promote the principles of Partnership, Participation and Active Protection under Te Tiriti o Waitangi acknowledging Māori as a Te Tiriti partner.”  In fact, Te Tiriti makes Māori subjects of the Crown, not partners with it. Nowhere in Te Tiriti are principles mentioned, let alone defined.

ACT proposes a Principles of the Treaty law that would define what Te Tiriti o Waitangi means, drawing on the actual Te Tiriti text.  The wording in the proposed new law may be something like: 

1. The democratically-elected New Zealand Government has sovereignty over New Zealand.

2. The New Zealand Government will protect New Zealanders’ property rights.

3. All New Zealanders are equal under the law, with the same rights and duties.

Given the widespread interest in co-governance it might be appropriate to include a principle based on subsidiarity.  Subsidiarity means that decisions should be taken at the lowest level possible, or closest to where the effects fall.  This may allow devolution of more public services.  Some initiatives may have a co-governance element so long as Parliament’s role as law maker is not eroded.

Te Tiriti o Waitangi was the text signed by most Māori rangatira and the Crown’s representatives in 1840.  As an international treaty, a domestic government was needed to deliver on Te Tiriti within New Zealand.  The NZ Constitution Act 1852 established government administration, Parliament, and a basis for democracy.  New Zealand’s constitution and government system evolved, leading to the NZ Constitution Act 1986.  This Act reduced the Crown’s role to the symbolic and procedural and conferred on the elected Parliament the full power to make laws.

The Waitangi Tribunal was set up in 1975 to investigate and make recommendations on claims of Crown breaches of Te Tiriti.  In 1985 it was given the right to investigate grievances from 1840.  However, the Tribunal has since taken Te Tiriti out of its historical context.  For example, ‘taonga’ in 1840 meant physical property, not language, broadcasting spectrum, and knowledge of indigenous flora and fauna.

The Waitangi Tribunal, the Human Rights Commission, and activist judges, engage in widespread “scope creep” that goes beyond their core roles.  Politicians, academics, and other activists have promoted tribalistic or race-specific interests rather than that of New Zealanders as a whole. This has extended to publication bans and deplatforming those whose views they disagree with.  This is a growing threat to our university system.

Tikanga (Māori custom) is now promoted as part of the legal system.  However, customs and norms evolve to solve practical problems a society faces, given its technology, institutions, and surrounding environment.  These problems include, for example, resource management, food safety, and conflict resolution.  Much tikanga is outdated.  Some may be suited to the modern world, for example rahui applied in resource management.  However, there is no body of tikanga that Māori could agree on to replace much of our common law.

The implementation of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 is a vivid example of what can go wrong when judicial or other non-elected actors depart from Parliamentary intent.  Democracy Action has published an excellent analysis of the Act.  See also commentary by Graham Adams published by The Platform: ‘Coastal court action flies under the radar’

The Marine and Coastal Area Act creates new rights that are only available to Māori. These include protected customary rights, consultative rights, and Customary Marine Title (CMT).  A CMT encompasses ownership elements. These include the right to permit or withhold permission for infrastructure activities, some conservation activities, ownership of non-nationalised minerals, rights to Crown royalties, and the right to control access to wahi tapu sites (trespassers may be fined).

This Marine and Coastal law was enacted under John Key’s coalition government deal with the Māori Party to repeal and replace Helen Clark’s Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004.  The 2011 legislation allowed rights over the foreshore and seabed to be granted to Māori through High Court hearings or direct Crown negotiations.

John Key assured the public that only a “relatively small” amount of New Zealand’s marine and coastal area would end up going into customary title, and that most New Zealanders would notice no change.  He was wrong on the first point and right on the second.  New Zealanders will notice no big changes while the claim process is underway.  However, they will certainly notice the scale of the customary title awards that are likely to be awarded.

When the government enacted the legislation in 2011, the Minister responsible, Chris Finlayson, stated that the Act set a very high bar to reach for a court to grant customary marine title to an area. This included proving exclusive use and occupation of the area since 1840 without substantial interruption, and to have held the area in accordance with tikanga. 

However, judges decided that a literal application of the test of exclusivity and continuity since 1840 would be too onerous and would mean virtually no claims could succeed. That outcome, they declared, would be “inconsistent with the Treaty/te Tiriti”.  Since then, recent judgements have determined that holding an area in accordance with tikanga takes precedence over ‘exclusive use and occupation’.

 A 2017 deadline for lodging claims was stipulated. The specific criteria for successful applications were narrow.  However, activist judges expanded those criteria, and created new status for tikanga to become part of New Zealand law.

Around 200 applications to the High Court have been submitted, with around 385 subject to behind-doors negotiation with Government. The process has the potential to be one of the biggest transfers of property in New Zealand history.  However, voters have little understanding of the claims process despite its enormous ramifications.  Applicants receive substantial funding to advance their claims while opposing parties receive no support.  With some estimates being around $30M in taxpayer support for claimants so far, the processes have created yet another industry of iwi advisers, lawyers and tikanga “experts”.

Ideally, property rights need to be well-defined, excludable, tradeable, and visibly connected to the wider economy. Property owners may pay rates, be responsible for pest control and biosecurity, and perhaps for mitigating negative impacts their property may have on others.  Elinor Ostrom documented how the interaction of people and ecosystems showed that voluntary cooperation can efficiently manage natural resources without state ownership or private markets.

The High Court has awarded Māori groups customary title and other exclusive rights to the entire South Wairarapa coastline.  This decision draws on a Court of Appeal interpretation of the Act, which involved a 40km stretch of coastline in the Bay of Plenty. In this case, tikanga was given precedence over the common law test of exclusive use and occupation set out in the Act. 

Currently, applications for the recognition of customary rights relating to the northern portion of the Wairarapa coast are being heard in the Wellington High Court.  At the same time, 15 Māori groups have applications for Whāngarei Harbour currently being heard in the High Court.

In late March 2024, iwi demanded that the Port of Tauranga pay a “mitigation fee” of $75-100 million as a condition of support for a resource consent for expansion.  It is unclear whether such a fee is justifiable or whether it is a form of (lawful) price gouging or “veto economics.”  

The Marine and Coastal Area Act seems to be “all rights and no responsibilities” for iwi.  It smells of tribalistic rent seeking and nepotism and could turn iwi against each other.  It needs amendment to reflect Parliament’s intent in 2011 and to avoid behaviour that can threaten key infrastructure development.

Biochar for productivity and climate change mitigation: What are we waiting for?

If you wanted to invent a country best placed to manage climate change it would look a lot like New Zealand.  An island nation in the middle of a vast ocean, since oceans take the rough edges off some climate change extremes.  Mountainous, with abundant water, hydropower resources and geothermal power.  A high coastline to land area ratio and in the “Roaring Forties”, assuring high wind power capability.  Low cost, high carbon wood to underpin new sustainable development opportunities.

Yet the reality of human-induced climate change is still contested in New Zealand. Those who understand the hard science often struggle to keep track of the political-economy issues domestically and internationally.  Rhetoric, virtue signaling, and unfunded statements of wishful intent are often assumed to be binding treaty obligations and enforceable contractual law. 

Weaknesses in our climate change policies result from inconsistencies between the ETS system, emissions budgets, the “Nationally-Determined Contribution” (NDC) mechanism under the Paris Agreement, and the goal to achieve zero net emissions of greenhouse gases (with the exception of biogenic methane) by 2050.

The ETS mechanism seeks to use competitive pricing to internalize externalities through a market auction system.  In practice the ETS system has largely failed. The four New Zealand auctions held in 2023 did not get a single buyer. The March 2024 auction sold only $190M units to 16 participants, far less than expectations.

In December 2015, the Paris Agreement asked countries to declare an “Initial Nationally-Determined Contribution” (INDC) for the period 2021-30.  According to Barry Brill’s analysis the Ardern Government in 2021 offered to “donate” $30 billion for offshore climate change mitigation endeavours.  This was as part of its 2021-30 NDC under the Paris Agreement.  Offshore spending on such a scale and lacking rigorous investment analysis is surely a poor investment for New Zealand. There has been fraud as well as weak financial management in offshore carbon credit and offsets markets, lack of transparency and good accounting practice, and wild price swings.  Large sums of money have been spent with little to show for it.

Surely the 2050 goal could be achieved if NDC money was spent entirely in New Zealand, for example on offshore wind turbines, transportation electrification, passive energy housing, and in demonstrating how wood can replace oil, coal, natural gas, concrete and steel in energy, construction and other markets.

We should encourage foreign businesses to invest in New Zealand to replace their emission-intensive processes with the low or nil emission hydro, wind and geothermal energy we are endowed with. The Bluff aluminum smelter is a long-standing exemplar of such a strategy, and data centres could be part of our future.

The NDC is set at a more ambitious level than emissions budgets. Though policy papers refer to international “obligations” in relation to climate change, they are more lists of what the government expects to do voluntarily, with no treaties, contracts, or enforcement mechanisms and no rigorous Parliamentary Budget assessment process standing behind them.   

The Paris Agreement specifically supports addressing climate change “in a manner that does not threaten food production.” The food and fibre sector dominates New Zealand’s economy.  It accounts for around 80% of New Zealand’s merchandise exports – $57.4 billion in the year to 30 June 2023.  Yet our pastoral farmers are treated derisively despite being among the best educated farmers in the world, running pastoral industries and supply chains that are world leaders in energy efficiency and low carbon use.

New Zealand climate policy has focused markedly on methane, though our emissions have remained quite stable for the last twenty years, and methane breaks down more quickly than CO₂.  From at least 1991 the global warming potential (GWP) of ruminant methane was believed to be 28 times more than CO₂.  However, from 2017 on work by Myles Allen and others demonstrated that methane’s GWP was more like seven times not 28 times that of CO₂. 

Despite the above, the discredited GWP figures are still locked into core New Zealand policy assumptions. They underpin or provide context for New Zealand’s greenhouse gas inventories, the Paris Agreement, and the Climate Change Commission’s work more generally.

Effort needs to continue with methane since our dairy and sheep industries mean New Zealand is a high emitter on a per capita basis.  This is visible to other countries that may seek to hold us to account, perhaps to advantage their own agricultural industries.  However, scientists have not yet developed credible solutions to methane emissions. We should not “risk the family farm” through punitive action on agricultural gases since under any scenario our emissions and their global impact will be vanishingly small. 

In a 2018 special report, the IPCC stated that to limit global warming to 1.5°C above prein­dus­trial levels we must also extract carbon from the atmosphere as well as reduce emissions.  That is, we need negative emissions technologies (NETs) as well as emissions abatement.

NETs in theory include conversion of pastoral grazing land into planted forest. However, this works only for the limited time that species such as radiata pine are growing and sequestering carbon.  It also conflicts with the Paris Agreement that addressing climate change “should not threaten food production.” 

“Carbon farming” through tree planting has seen pine monocultures take pastures out of food production and made land-use less flexible. Once the trees are planted little maintenance work is needed.  As farming jobs disappear rural communities are vulnerable to decline as small businesses close and public services are “rationalized.” 

IPCC experts have judged that direct air carbon capture and storage is too energy-intensive, and therefore too expensive. The venture capital firm DCVC concurred with the IPCC in a 2023 analysis and found that all such approaches it evaluated faced “multiple feasibility constraints.”

Peat soils, salt marshes and other wetlands usually have high carbon storage, as organic matter accumulates in wet conditions. Unlike pine forests, wetlands are not fire hazards, they protect biodiversity, however there are limits to how much more carbon they can sequester.

Many initiatives are underway to use tree biomass as long-term carbon stores.  Some of these proposals are to harvest wood and bury it, perhaps with some chemical treatment to slow its decay.  Astoundingly, these initiatives are often launched by “high tech” start-ups with backing from luminaires such as Bill Gates.  Those involved seem unaware that indigenous people in Amazonia and West Africa for thousands of years were turning biomass into charcoal and using this biochar to lift soil productivity. 

In the Amazonia there are large areas of dark, high fertility soils amidst the region’s weathered, thin and acidic soils. These “terra preta” (dark soils) were likely developed by indigenous people who dumped food scraps, manure waste, ashes and charcoal into then thin and infertile soils in their settlements.  Over decades these dumps became carbon-rich swathes of high productivity soil sitting within otherwise infertile soil deserts.

Terra preta soils date back over two thousand years. They can be two metres deep. Terra preta soil seems to regenerate itself at a rate of around one centimetre per year through processes that are not fully understood. Glomalin may play a role. It is also possible that small amounts of char continually migrate down providing habitat for microbes as they process surface-cover biomass. The microbes and fungi live and die inside the porous media increasing its carbon (biochar) content.

Biochar is not soil or fertilizer. It is carbon with high porosity and Cation Exchange Capacity (CEC). Biochar’s porosity and CEC helps water and nutrient retention and recycling and are associated with enhanced microbial activity and with healthier and more diverse soil microbiome. 

The international evidence is that biochar improves crop yields, especially on low fertility, low carbon and acidic soils, and in drought-prone environments.

Biochar can remove pollutants and yet recycle nutrients and retain water.  It can be used to purify wastewater.  It can remediate contaminated soils.  It can be used for activated carbon, in paints, construction, packaging materials and medicines. Above all, biochar can sequester carbon over intergenerational time frames.

Given the opportunities biochar creates, it is puzzling why it has not been more widely adopted.  Why for example is forest slash not pyrolyzed?  Managing forestry slash could see mobile pyrolizers turn waste wood into biochar on site, with the biochar spread back into the soil. This would help restore soil nutrient levels, reduce soil acidity, help retain water in drought-prone soils, and permanently lift soil carbon stocks.

In the modern world there can be a lack of respect for indigenous knowledge in such distant places as the Amazonia and West Africa. 

Biochar is an inherently diffuse rather than concentrated resource and this means the industry is made up of smaller businesses, with a lack of big companies with a strong lobbying voice.  Decentralization in industry organization does not sit well with some politicians and officials whose focus is reporting to overseas bureaucracies rather than solving problems down on the farm.  Soil carbon is difficult to measure to earn carbon credits and to report on New Zealand’s compliance with international agreements. However, biochar lends itself to Māori businesses operating on inalienable Māori land and taking a long term, intergenerational view of their investments.                                                                                 

For any pyrolysis biochar project, the end outcome for the biochar itself must be decided. So must be the value-adding cascade that occurs from the pyrolysis stage through to the final use made of the biochar.  This will determine what biomass will be turned into biochar, the pyrolysis process settings such as temperature and duration, any co-produced products such as bioenergy, the key use for the biochar batch (such as reducing nitrous oxide emissions or nitrate pollution of water) and the final use for the biochar as a permanent carbon store.

Several actions are required for biochar to take off on a large scale in New Zealand.  There needs to be formal government recognition of biochar’s value as a safe, long-term carbon store.  Ongoing research is needed to refine the biochar lifecycle process from pyrolysis through cascading value-add applications to final soil sequestration. Arguments that biochar’s longevity in soil has not been proven are erroneous and amount to willful blindness.  Biochar has been reported to provide a minimum 1,000-year biochar life. Charcoal from Māori cooking fires has been dated at 700 years old.

There needs to be a visible and well-functioning marketplace for biochar carbon credits. Progress is being made. Digital platform toucan.earth is building the infrastructure to make it easier for carbon credits to be bought, sold and retired.  BeZero, a credit rating platform, awarded an A rating to biochar as an engineered carbon removal project. This rating was awarded after assessment against risk factors, such as additionality, over-crediting, leakage, and non-permanence.

In 2023 toucan.earth established a seamless connection with the Finnish Puro.earth registry, facilitating credit transfers between their platforms. The digital platform has introduced an additional criteria-based screening process for Puro.earth projects.  Businesses with the heft of Microsoft and Shopify are now buying biochar CO₂ removal certificates from Puro.earth. 

The Singapore Government, the World Bank and the International Emissions Trading Association in late 2022 created the Climate Action Data Trust. This aimed to improve the credibility of the carbon credit trade. It has since grown to cover 85% of all credits issued to date and is set to expand coverage even more in 2024.

There seems to be no logical reason for further delay in making biochar a key part of New Zealand’s climate change action plan.

So, what are we waiting for?

Superannuation, KiwiSaver, and New Zealand’s economic development

The Retirement Commissioner has released a paper on aspects of New Zealand Superannuation (NZS).  Its focus includes affordability, fairness, age of eligibility, and the treatment of those over 65 who continue in the workforce whilst also receiving NZS.

What the Commissioner does not discuss is the relationship between superannuation systems, domestic savings rates and capital markets, and the impacts these have on productivity, international competitiveness, and per capita GDP. Yet how superannuation systems are designed has profound effects on New Zealand’s economic performance.

NZS is the main reason for New Zealand’s low rates of elderly poverty compared to other developed countries.  Its simplicity is a strength.   It is not means tested.  It does not penalise those who continue to work beyond 65.  

NZS costs less as a percentage of GDP than what many other OECD countries spend on pensions. New Zealand has the eighth lowest pension cost of the 38 OECD countries, so we are in the lowest expenditure quartile.  The NZS eligibility age is in line with our peers:  71% of OECD countries have a pension eligibility age of 65 or below.  However, some countries are proposing increases of around two years, taking several decades to fully achieve this new eligibility age. These proposals would still leave 53% of OECD countries with a pension age of 65 or lower.

Countries that have lifted eligibility to over 65 often have tier two (compulsory saving) schemes in place, such as Australia’s ‘Super’, as well as tier three (voluntary) schemes.  Tier two schemes have engaged with investors, boosted investment literacy, and given people more options, for example through ensuring access to some assets before pension eligibility age is reached.

Current NZS policy settings will have to adapt to demographic change and its fiscal implications.  NZS cost $10.9 billion in 2013 and $21.63 billion in 2023.  Future options include lifting the age of eligibility or increasing the tax rate for higher earning over 65-year-olds who choose to keep working. Lifting the eligibility age would impact some workers with health or other problems who can manage working till 65 but not for much longer.  Special provisions such as early retirement options could be introduced, though these would make a simple NZS scheme more complicated.

There is a perceived fairness issue when many New Zealanders receiving superannuation are also earning over $100,000 a year from paid employment.  Some reframing could be helpful. For example, receiving superannuation while working beyond 65 is now seen as an entitlement, and loss of this NZS income would be perceived as a rights violation.  However, if receiving NZS while working was framed not as an entitlement but as an extra benefit that must be applied for, some workers, reflecting on fairness, would not apply for this extra income.  Adam Smith wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments before he wrote Wealth of Nations!

Many countries encourage private pension schemes; however these are often high cost. For example, Australia and Canada both spend around 2% of GDP to subsidise private pension schemes. 

The New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF) (the “Cullen Fund”) was established through the New Zealand Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001.  It is a tax smoothing device to help manage the state’s unfunded superannuation liability. It is also a capital pool for investment that can deliver high returns, whether in industrial development, innovation, infrastructure, or other fields.  In just over 20 years, the NZSF has amassed close to $70 billion.

Low domestic saving and investment rates partly reflect weak incentives to invest.  New Zealand has a thin share market with limited liquidity and investor choice.  Many cooperative and private businesses are not open to external investment.  New Zealanders therefore have limited opportunities to invest savings domestically. 

New Zealand borrows or seeks equity from offshore to make up for its low domestic savings.  However, this can impact on the exchange rate in ways that reduce export sector competitiveness.  Moreover, New Zealand’s private sector borrowing is skewed by home mortgage and farm lending at the expense of new business creation.  Scarce domestic savings are therefore misallocated away from innovative productive investment into inflating prices of inelastic housing and farmland assets. 

Demand for housing must translate into more housing being built rather than inflating the price of existing houses. This requires minimising regulatory restrictions on new housing developments and investing in underpinning infrastructure.  At least on the margin, this would reduce the need for borrowing from offshore banks to fund housing.

New Zealand needs increased domestic savings, and this requires some compulsion.  The Norman Kirk government introduced a compulsory contributory superannuation scheme in 1974.  This delivered a basic pension and required compulsory contributions of 8 per cent of gross income – 4 per cent from employees and 4 per cent from employers.  Accounts were individualised and portable. The scheme was designed to lift savings and enhance investment in the economy, as well as supplementing the old age pension.

However, Robert Muldoon’s 1975 election win saw compulsory superannuation replaced with a universal non-contributory scheme with age 60 eligibility. 

The late Brian Gaynor and others have estimated that, had the 1974 scheme been retained, it would now be worth over $500 billion. We would have deeper and more patient capital markets. More of our high productivity businesses would be global players, owned and anchored in New Zealand.  New Zealanders, including retirees, would have higher incomes.

In 2007 KiwiSaver was launched.  As of 31 March 2023, KiwiSaver’s total balance was $93.7 billion.   Almost two thirds of New Zealanders have a KiwiSaver account.  KiwiSaver and NZSF funds total around $164 billion.  Such funds tend to have a “home bias” in their investments.

KiwiSaver complements the NZSF and can also be drawn on for first home ownership.  However, it is not compulsory and it lacks the flexibility needed to function as a “second tier” investment fund such as Australia’s.

Greater economy-wide saving and investment is productivity-enhancing and lifts international competitiveness.  This translates into higher incomes that allow people to save and invest more, as well as enjoy higher living standards.  A strategy to achieve this, while also delivering security in retirement, could include regulatory reform in housing, enhancing housing infrastructure, and making KiwiSaver compulsory, with higher contribution rates.  KiwiSaver could also be more flexible as an actively managed fund that can support different investment options.  These might range from venture capital investment through to earlier retirement.

NZS would still provide a basic pension, while KiwiSaver would engage with wealth creators, risk takers, and those who want more choices in life.

Russian economic history, including a folk song lens

The new coalition government in New Zealand gives some hope that democracy, universalism, and Enlightenment values can win out over identity politics and tribalism. This frees up time to explore other issues, such as why some inherently wealthy countries underperform compared to their potential.

Russia has for centuries produced a disproportionate number of the world’s greatest writers, composers, musicians, scientists, mathematicians, artists, singers and chess players. Yet it seems incapable of delivering competent political leaders who come to power democratically and under the rule of law, and then act in the Russian peoples’ interests.  This failing results in a poorer economic performance than could be predicted from Russia’s human and natural capital endowments.

This database records per capita GDP by country using 2022 figures. It records Russia as poorer per capita than all of the Baltic states and such other countries as Turkey, Romania and Hungary.

Harvard University’s Atlas of Economic Complexity gauges the sophistication of countries’ export product mix.  The raw trade data on goods are derived from countries reporting to the United Nations Statistical Division (COMTRADE). The trade data on services are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics database, via the World Development Indicators.

Comparative per capita income measures can be nominal or adjusted to reflect purchasing power parities (ppps).  Using 2021 data avoids some data quality issues arising from President Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine that began in February 2022.

Using US$, as at 2021 Russia had a per capita income of $12,593 (ppp $34,043) as compared to Poland $17,999 (ppp $38,134), Germany $51,203 (ppp $58,798) Ukraine $4,827 (ppp $14,289), New Zealand $49,996 (ppp $48,443) and the USA $70,219 (ppp $70, 219).  What is notable in these figures is that Poland, as well as New Zealand, are richer in per capita income than Russia, and that Ukraine is very poor by European and western world standards.

Ukraine suffered disproportionally from Stalin’s policies, the impact of the Nazi invasion from 22 June 1941, and from certain later events in the Cold War period and during and after the Soviet Union’s break-up. Ukraine has also long had corruption problems.

Economic performance is wider than incomes.  It includes health, life expectancy, equity, self-assessed wellbeing, trust in institutions, and a sense of shared purpose.  Politicians often promote narratives that build national pride, even when the factual basis of these narratives is questionable.  Russia, for example, has long promoted the view that it is a beleaguered country, whether threatened with NATO attack, Ukrainian “Nazis”, or mysterious “enemies within”.  This view necessitates regular revision of history textbooks to accommodate changes in narratives, and Russians simply accept that it is safest to go along with new narratives uncritically.

“Official narratives” that include starring roles for emerging leaders are popular in Russia, though sometimes short-lived.  The Wagner Group’s leader Yevgeny Prigozhin started his career as a street mugger, and created a catering business that guaranteed it would not poison Vladimir Putin.   Prigozhin then became a populist war hero, until he mutinied and was murdered two months later.  Serious political opponents of the existing Russian President mostly end up dead, jailed or exiled.  Such events are so predictable they may perversely increase social stability in that Russia’s political life becomes predictable.  The key rules are to go along with the prevailing Kremlin narrative and avoid annoying Vladimir Putin.

However, authentic insights into even the most controlled societies can come from informal sources,  including folklore, jokes, fables and satire.  One lens on a society is folk songs that have survived through the generations and therefore have something enduring to say.    

Bob Dylan opined on folk music in a 1966 interview:

“folk music is a word I can’t use…I have to think of all this as traditional music.  There’s nobody that’s going to kill traditional music. All these songs about roses growing out of people’s brains and lovers who are really geese and swans that turn into angels – they’re not going to die.  Songs like Which Side Are You On? And I Love You, Porgy – they’re not folk-music songs; they’re political songs. They’re already dead….traditional music is too unreal to die. It doesn’t need to be protected.”

Bob Dylan songs such as Only a Pawn in their Game and Lonesome death of Hattie Carroll elucidated what was wrong with America at a particular time.  They remain brilliant songs, however they belong to a specific historical context and will eventually fade. Some of Dylan’s love songs will never fade.

Melodies are like public or non-rival goods that can be borrowed for a new song.  The Seekers song, The Carnival is over, uses the melody of the Russian Song of Stenka Razin. Some folk songs go back centuries, with different lyrics added to repurpose a song to deal with a new context.  The Red Flag’s lyrics were written in 1889, however it is sung to the melody of the old German carol “O Tannenbaum” (“O Christmas Tree“).   

Most folk songs cross cultural barriers.  This is a Ukrainian joke song that is also much loved and performed in Russia. You tricked me

Why is Russia not richer, given its resources and its talents?  It faces no insurmountable human or physical resource constraints. Like other developed countries Russia has a low birth rate, however it has a far bigger population than any other European country. It has good educational levels. It is the wealthiest country in Eastern Europe.  It is the biggest nation on earth, with the richest and most diverse natural resource base. 

Many Russian people have a poor understanding of their history.  Few in Russia are aware that American Relief Administration food aid organized by Herbert Hoover saved millions of Russians from famine from 1919 to 1923. Many Russians seem unaware that the Second World War began in September 1939 with a joint attack by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union on Poland.

The Putin regime blames conflict in Ukraine on NATO, and implies the United States controls NATO.  NATO was always a defensive alliance, formed in 1949 to guard against the Soviet threat to Europe.  NATO did nothing when the 1956 Hungarian rebellion was brutally suppressed.  It did nothing in 1968 when Soviet forces invaded Czechoslovakia to end the “Prague Spring” liberalization.  NATO’s June 1999 intervention to end the violence in Kosovo is the closest it has ever got to large scale combat operations. 

Over 2005 – 2021 Angela Merkel ran down the German armed forces to the extent of losing core operational capabilities.  Hungary has refused to support Ukraine’s defense against Russia.  Some NATO state leaders have been almost powerless to act because of internal political opposition.  Donald Trump’s presidential candidacy creates more uncertainties. 

However, while democracy has its weaknesses, throughout history the Russian head of state has always held too much power and this helps explain Russia’s poor economic performance. For simplicity, let’s argue that Russian history starts with the establishment of the Rus’ state in the north in the year 862, ruled by Varangians. These were Viking warriors, settlers and traders from what is now Sweden.

In England in 1215 King John acceded to the nobilities’ demands for protection of their property rights, for due process, and for the rule of law that cannot be overridden by the King in an arbitrary way.

Three centuries after Magna Carta, Russia through Ivan the Terrible chose a different path. Ivan was Grand Prince of Moscow and all Russia from 1533, and Tsar of all Russia from 1547 until his death in 1584. The term “formidable” rather than “terrible” better translates Ivan’s Russian title.    

During the Ivan the Terrible/Formidable reign (1533 – 1584) Russia was engaged in many conflicts.  The Livonia War 1558 – 1583 was fought for control of Old Livonia, that is present day Estonia and Latvia.  This war in the west was not a Russian success.  However Russia expanded its territory eastward into Siberia, including through what we might now term “public-private partnerships.” In 1558, Ivan gave the Stroganov merchant family the “license” to colonize “the abundant region along the Kama River” and, in 1574, lands in the Ural Mountains region along the rivers Tura and Tobol. The Stroganov family also received permission to build forts along the Ob and Irtysh rivers.

Around 1577 the Stroganovs engaged the Cossack leader Yermak Timofeyevich to protect their lands from attacks by Kuchum Khan, the last Siberian Khan leader.  Yermak’s forces were instrumental in Russia’s eventual takeover of Siberia.  Yermak is celebrated in folksongs such as: The storm roared.

Ivan’s reign saw the development of a centrally-administered Russian state and an empire that included non-Slavic territories.  Ivan did draw on a “Chosen Council,” an informal advisory body.  The Council’s influence waned, and then disappeared in the early 1560s.  Ivan established greater autocratic control over the Russian nobility, which he violently purged using Russia’s first political police, the Oprichnina.

Under later leaders, such as Peter the Great in the late 17th and early 18th century territorial expansion continued, including into central Asia and the Caucasus and with the acquisition of territories along the Baltic Sea. Peter the Great embarked on sweeping reforms in the late 17th and early 18th centuries to modernize Russia and turn it into a major European power. His reforms encompassed the bureaucracy, the tax system, trade regulation and the military. He created from swampy land a new city, St. Petersburg, that became a great trade, commercial and cultural centre.

In Russia the winter cold and the steppe o steppe all around likely benefited Russia’s development as a great power.  As Napoleon and later Hitler found, for geographic reasons and because of the tenacity of its people Russia was impossible to defeat and completely occupy. Even when Moscow was in the hands of the French.

In the lead up to “the Great War” breaking out in 1914, all of the continental great powers were in theory absolute monarchies. However, no one doubted that the Tsar was more powerful than his French, Austrian or Prussian peers.  Neither statute nor common law protected even the most aristocratic subjects from the Tsar’s whims.  By contrast, especially in France and Austria, aristocratic assemblies and supporting judicial institutions bridled a monarch’s power.

The Russian military was ill-prepared in 1914, just as it had been against the Japanese in 1905.  Yet Russian folksongs at the start of the war were full of confidence In the yard or in the garden.  As the war progressed in areas such as along the Carpathian mountains  the mood in folksongs became more gloomy, with the Cossacks seen as key assets, though with some unease about their loyalty. 

After the Russian Revolution, Civil War broke out between the Red (Bolshevik) and White armies.  A young man is implored by his relatives to stay at home and not join the Red Army.   The sadness in this song is that the idealistic youth would, if he survived the Civil War, then have to survive Stalin’s purges, after which he would face the Nazi invasion in June 1941. A more cheerful dance version of this song has been developed.

Low agricultural productivity held back Russia for centuries. Russian society held peasants in low esteem. A serfdom-based agricultural labour force system was introduced in the 16^th century.  Peasants were legally bound to the nobility and were obliged to provide labour services and a portion of their agricultural produce to their lords.  This was at a time depicted in “Song of the Volga Boatmen”  when men were cheaper than draught horses.

Serfdom was abolished in 1861.  However, low productivity continued for over a century to be a drag on Russia (and the Soviet Union’s) economy.  Kulaks (richer peasants) were often reviled in Russian literature and in Soviet times labelled “class enemies.” Stalin’s solution was to force peasants into communes and collectives.

On 17 November 1929 a Central Committee resolution began the collectivization of Soviet agriculture.  On 11 September 1932 Stalin sent a letter to a Politburo ally, Lazar Kaganovich, demanding the subjugation of the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).  The Holodomor, also known as the Great Ukrainian Famine, was a man-made famine in Soviet Ukraine from 1932 to 1933 that killed millions of Ukrainians.   Holodomor was part of the wider Soviet famine of 1930 – 1933 which affected the major grain-producing regions of the Soviet Union.

Markevich et al (2023) constructed unique panel data to study the causes of Ukrainian famine mortality (Holodomor) during 1932-33.  They found that Ukraine (the Soviet Union) produced enough food in 1932 to avoid famine.  Anti-Ukrainian bias in Soviet policy explains up to 92% of famine mortality in Ukraine and 77% in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus; approximately half of the total effect comes from bias in the centrally planned food procurement policy.  “Mosquito” is a Ukrainian insurgent song reflecting bitterness with both Hitler and Stalin

This Ukrainian folk song gives an uncensored opinion of Stalin

Autocrats are typically corrupted by power and their decision making deteriorates further as their advisors become sycophantic. This was especially marked in Stalin’s time.  Osip Mandelstam was brave to write his  Stalin Epigram  It cost him his life.

Eisenstein’s 1944 film Ivan the Terrible sought to burnish Ivan’s reputation as a strong leader, validating Stalin’s own image. Vladimir Putin’s partial rehabilitation of Stalin’s image may also be designed to enhance his own.

The Soviet economic system was always going to fail because the conflation of economic and political power misallocated resources and there was inadequate reward for individual effort. “Hrechanyky” is a folk song that spoofs the economic  weaknesses of the Soviet system.

True democracy includes one person, one vote, and processes in place for peaceful transitions in power when, for example, an incumbent loses to a successful challenger.  It also means that the rule of law must apply equally to all.  The problem comes not from what is on the statute book, but that different judges interpret the law differently, typically in response to political expectations. The rule of law in Russia is, in reality, rule by those who interpret the law and who themselves may be above it.

There is a deeply-seated fatalism among Russian people which manifests in tendencies to follow the crowd rather than develop individual opinions. As Pasternak argued in Doctor Zhivago:

“…the root of all the evil to come was the loss of faith in the value of personal opinions. People imagined that it was out of date to follow their own moral sense, that they must all sing the same tune in chorus…”

Yet many folk songs celebrate rebels and rebellions, including those that challenge the existence of the Tsar in power.  

 “The Cliff” celebrates the Stenka Razin challenge to the Tsarist tyranny.  

“Oh, it is not yet evening” is a song that alludes to Cossack rebellion in a more mystical way.

Vladimir Putin argued that the breakup of the Soviet Union was a great catastrophe.  There is some truth in this. However, much of the real damage was done during the transitional period from around1991 – 1999. President Boris Yeltsin navigated economic and constitutional crises and conflict in Chechnya (the Chechen Republic).  Yeltsin permitted oligarchs to take control of privatized assets, with billions being taken out of the country. Radical economic reforms sought to switch from state control to a market-based economy within impossible timeframes and without the supporting institutions required. 

Without an effective tax system in place public services were badly degraded.  Corruption and organized crime were rampant. Vladimir Putin was appointed Prime Minister in 1999 and elected President in 2000.  Putin weakened the power of oligarchs and strengthened his own Presidential powers. He put much effort into paying off Russia’s foreign debt.  He deserves some credit for key improvements in fiscal policy and central bank operations, for example to manage the fluctuations in earnings from commodity exports.

Putin’s first two Presidential terms 2000 – 2008 were in good economic times.  Russia’s was an economy boosted by commodity prices, especially for oil and gas.  Russia’s GDP and real incomes grew. The middle class expanded while the number of people living below the poverty line decreased dramatically. 

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Russia was the world’s second biggest arms exporter, second in space launches, was exporting nuclear power plants, was significant in the IT industry, and was seeking to develop its civil aviation industry.  A remarkable achievement for post-Soviet Russia has been its move from being a major food importer to becoming the world’s biggest wheat exporter.

However, exports were only 8.7% of GDP in 2007, compared to 20% in 2000.  Russia’s recession during 2008–2009 reflected that Russia was still heavily dependent on oil and gas, fertilizers and other commodities. 

High commodity prices can boost growth, however not sustainably.  What motivates the innovation that makes a long-term difference is the esteem that society, especially those with power, confer upon entrepreneurs, that is those who will “give it a go.” 

Russia’s financial crisis in 2014–2017 resulted from oil prices crashing and international sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered retaliatory actions that destabilized Russia’s financial markets and led to widespread disinvestment by foreign investors.

Until around 1800 economic growth around the world proceeded at a glacial pace for centuries.  The Great Enrichment began firstly in Britain and rapidly thereafter in countries that valued economic liberalism.  This meant esteem for entrepreneurs,  freedom to start businesses and enter occupations that were open to qualified new entries, and a rule of law that excluded political  and tribalistic favouritism. 

Economic liberalism in recent times has driven rapid growth rates in economies such as China and India while other illiberal BRICs economies such as Brazil, Russia and South Africa have languished.

The conflation of political and economic power leads to productivity losses as economic agents respond to signals from politicians and bureaucrats rather than markets.  When the political (and economic) power is held by one autocrat then risk is highly concentrated in one person.  This led to such disasters as Mao Zedong’s “war on sparrows” and President Putin’s unilateral decision to invade Ukraine in February 2022.

Russia will do a lot better in future if political and economic power are as far as possible separated, free speech, authentic democracy and the rule of law are restored, and entrepreneurs come to be as esteemed as they are in the United States.  Cossack songs are a treasure for humanity.  It would be great if they could be complemented by folk songs about entrepreneurs that can also be passed on to future generations.

References

Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard Growth Lab.

Markevich, A. et al 2003: The Causes of Ukrainian Famine Mortality, 1932-33.  NBER Working Paper: 29089.

Te Tiriti o Waitangi cedes sovereignty to the Crown, and can be unifying rather than divisive

Repeated claims are made that Māori never ceded sovereignty to the Crown. These claims come from sources such as the Waitangi Tribunal, activists, academics, and from Te Pāti Māori. 

A display in Te Papa on an English language version of the Treaty of Waitangi has been vandalized, presumably because it stated that the Crown assumed full sovereignty over New Zealand.  Activists argue that the Māori language Te Tiriti o Waitangi is the only legitimate Treaty text, since most Māori assenting to a Treaty signed this version.  I agree with these assertions.  However, I disagree that in signing Te Tiriti, Māori did not cede sovereignty to the Crown.

Te Tiriti confers on the Crown governance powers (kāwanatanga), including the ability to make and enforce laws, and to uphold the rule of law.  It protects Māori property rights through tino rangatiratanga or chieftainship, consistent with Magna Carta and with common law.  It also makes Māori subjects of the Crown, with all the rights and obligations inherent in this.  Te Tiriti protects all New Zealanders, not just Māori. 

Over 500 Māori leaders and the British Crown’s representatives signed Te Tiriti o Waitangi in 1840.  It was an international agreement that was the first step in the creation of a colonial administration in New Zealand, leading to the NZ Constitution Act 1852. 

McQueen (2020) comprehensively summarizes the evidence that Māori fully understood what they were signing up to in Te Tiriti, including Crown sovereignty and its relationship with tino rangatiratanga. 

In discussions with Māori leading up to Te Tiriti’s signing, Hobson, Henry Williams and others emphasised ensuring Māori knew what they were asked to agree to.   Henry Williams translated Hobson’s presentation into Māori.  William Colenso took detailed notes of Tiriti discussions in 1840 and recorded them in The Authentic and Genuine History of the Signing of the Treaty of Waitangi.  James Busby attested to these notes in the month following Te Tiriti’s signing.  Colenso’s notes accurately reflected the Māori perspective, including the key arguments that swayed the chiefs to sign Te Tiriti.  Others who left accounts of the discussions included Hobson, Pompallier and Henry Williams.  

The Kohimarama Conference in 1860 was at the time the largest ever gathering of Māori chiefs in New Zealand.   Many of the chiefs who signed Te Tiriti in 1840 were at the 1860 Conference. All of them affirmed their support for Crown sovereignty.

Understanding of Te Tiriti o Waitangi must be based on the signatories’ intent and the meanings of words as at 1840. For example, in 1840 ‘taonga’ meant real tangible property such as a waka, not intangible ‘property’ such as language.  It did not include things that were yet to be invented such as broadcasting spectrum.

Te Tiriti has a preamble that stresses the need for government and the rule of law.  Te Tiriti has three Ture (Articles.)

In Article One the Crown is given the power to govern New Zealand (kāwanatanga).  Māori before 1840 had no conception of a sovereign nation state.  The neologism ‘kāwanatanga’ (the authority to govern) was therefore coined.  

By 1840 many Māori had visited Port Jackson and were aware of the power governors had.  In December 1838, at the command of Governor George Gipps, seven white British subjects were executed for the murder of some aboriginal civilians in the Myall Creek massacre.  Māori knew that kāwanatanga as agreed to in Tiriti Article One came with the power of life or death. 

British officials working on a Treaty with Māori saw the need to protect individual rights as well as the rights of chiefs.  In 1840 the Highland clearances in Scotland were a recent memory. Clan chiefs and landlords had enclosed smallholdings into large commercial farming operations and driven crofters off their land and into penury.  British officials were concerned to avoid a similar outcome in New Zealand.

In Article Two, the Queen recognises te tino rangatiratanga, that is property rights over lands, dwelling places and other properties.  Queen Victoria promises te tino rangatiratanga over property of all New Zealanders.

The relationship between kāwanatanga and tino rangatiratanga has some affinity with the relationships between statute law and common law.  That is, the two co-exist, however where there is a conflict statute law prevails.  Kāwanatanga is more powerful than tino rangatiratanga.    

Te Tiriti Article Three guarantees equal rights as Crown subjects for all. An important subtlety in Article Three is that the Crown implicitly offers all New Zealanders protection against foreign attack. Marion du Fresne’s 1772 visit saw violent clashes and fatalities on both sides.  Some Māori probably feared a return visit.  One hundred years after Te Tiriti was signed France surrendered to Germany and the British Empire (including New Zealand) stood alone against Nazism.

As an international treaty, a domestic government was needed to deliver on Te Tiriti within New Zealand.  This was given effect to through the NZ Constitution Act 1852.  This established government administration, Parliament, and a basis for democracy.  New Zealand’s constitution and government system evolved, leading to the NZ Constitution Act 1986.  This Act reduced the Crown’s role to the symbolic and procedural and conferred on the elected Parliament the full power to make laws.

New Zealand has one of the world’s oldest continuously functioning democracies.  Its economy and society are based on democracy, equal rights, an inclusive market economy, and the rule of law.  It reflects the values of the Enlightenment, secularity, science, reason, and an open society. 

In recent times power has been shifting away from elected representatives in Parliament and local government and towards the judiciary and entities such as the Waitangi Tribunal and the Human Rights Commission.  New Zealand is vulnerable to judicial activism, to “scope creep” as agencies such as the Waitangi Tribunal and the Human Rights Commission exceed their briefs, and to tribalistic or race-based ideology.

The State Owned Enterprise (SOE) Act 1986 referred to undefined Treaty principles.  There are no principles stated in Te Tiriti.  The Court of Appeal’s 1987 ‘Lands case’ saw the Treaty as “a partnership between races” or between the Crown and Māori.  However, Māori cannot be both subjects of the Crown and partners with it.

The Waitangi Tribunal was set up in 1975 to investigate and make recommendations on claims of Crown breaches of Te Tiriti.  In 1985 it was given the right to investigate grievances from 1840.  However, the Tribunal has taken the Treaty out of its historical context.  “Presentism” has distorted thinking, with the Tribunal acting as if people in 1840 had the same knowledge and incentives as we have now.

In its reports on the Te Paparahi o Te Raki (Northland) inquiry the Tribunal “found” that the Northern chiefs did not cede sovereignty when they signed He Whakaputanga (The Declaration of Independence) in 1835 or Te Tiriti o Waitangi (The Treaty of Waitangi) five years later.

The Te Raki inquiry related to 415 individual Treaty claims.  The reports call on the Crown to apologise to Te Raki Māori for “failing to recognise and respect the tino rangatiratanga (sovereignty) of hapū and iwi”.  The Tribunal therefore spuriously equates tino rangatiratanga with sovereignty, using the terms interchangeably.   

The Tribunal recommends that the Crown enter discussions with Te Raki Māori to “determine appropriate constitutional processes and institutions at national, iwi and hapū levels to recognise, respect and give effect to their Tiriti/Treaty rights.”  This is a call for constitutional change along He Puapua lines, rather than focusing on restitution for Te Tiriti breaches.

The previous Labour government’s initiatives such as He Puapua, the “Three Waters” reforms, the exclusionary and accusatory history curriculum, and the promotion of Māori cultural content in inappropriate contexts such as basic science and in trades training have amplified tribalism and racialism.  They have also weakened our education and our science systems and raised questions about the political neutrality of the media and some parts of the public service.

Rather than being a document to support elitist interests, the 1840 Te Tiriti covers all parties with an interest.  These include Wikitoria, Te Kuini o Ingarani (Victoria, the Queen of England), nga tangata o tona Iwi (the individual members of her people); te Kawana (the Governor);  nga rangatira (the chiefs); nga tangata maori o Nu Tirani (ordinary New Zealanders); and nga tangata o Ingarani (the English people).

Te Tiriti therefore covers not just the key leaders but the people themselves; the ngā tāngata of Nu Tirani (New Zealanders).  There is no mention of race in Te Tiriti.  The Queen undertakes to look after everyone and to be colour-blind in doing so.

Positive things can happen due to the election result, with more New Zealanders demanding improved economic, social and environmental performance. 

Te Tiriti o Waitangi and ACT’s philosophy suggests affinities more so than discordances.  For example, ACT supports strong property rights (Te Tiriti Article Two and tino rangatiratanga).  It supports subsidiarity – the principle that decisions should be taken at the lowest level possible, or closest to where the effects fall.  This may mean devolution of some public services, and more choice, for example in schools with different curricula and pedagogy.  Some such initiatives may have a co-governance element so long as it does not erode Parliament’s role as law maker.

Above all we must trust young people coming through.  Lots of discerning youth will see through identity politics and the evils of categorising people by race.  They will not forever tolerate Parliament behaving like a theatre for class clowns and will instead expect it to make a positive difference to people’s lives and to the natural environment that we all depend upon.

Reference

McQueen, E.  2020: One sun in the sky. The untold story of sovereignty and the Treaty of Waitangi.  Galatas NZ Ltd.

Colin J. Webb 1949 – 2023

Reflections on Colin Webb and the science and tertiary education systems

I first met Colin Webb in 1995 on his first day at FRST (“the Foundation”) as our new Manager, Funding.  This was one of the toughest management jobs in the science system. I asked Colin how his first few days in Wellington had been and he told me how well his cat, Roy, had adjusted.  This was my first taste of Colin’s serene, existential calm – as well as his love of cats. When speaking at my wedding Colin claimed that cats were indirectly responsible for the rise of agriculture in the Fertile Crescent since they controlled rodents that would otherwise destroy the harvest.

Colin’s career up till 1995 was in science delivery, rather than the policy, strategy, funding and evaluation side which the scientists often saw as bureaucratic overhead.

Some history is useful.  The DSIR was established in 1926 to help meet New Zealand’s public good science needs at a time when our universities were under-developed. Together with other government-owned laboratories it was basically bulk-funded and self-directed.  Private sector research was limited to applied technology, except for some industry collective research associations.

Under the system in place, the market for researchers in basic science was monopsonistic.  That is, government was a dominant “buyer” of research outputs and it controlled the price paid for them. There was a thin market for research scientists, However, Government-owned research organisations such as DSIR and MAF provided high job security and reasonable remuneration.

Very little money was allocated competitively.  Some argued that this let scientists focus on science, not on filling in grant applications, however others argued it led to complacency or to Leibensteinian X-inefficiency (in the economics jargon).

FRST’s job was to create a market for science, however those immersed in Kenneth Arrow’s work and in Paul Romer’s new growth theory saw that the nature of knowledge creation and of non-rival goods meant the science system could not be run like a fish market. The 1990s was a lean time for public finances and there was concern that restructuring the science system would lead to funding cuts and job losses. However, MoRST’s Chief Executive, Basil Walker, was wily and had the intellectual heft to ensure the structural changes built Ministers’ confidence that science was a good thing to invest in.

The question was whether to run a competitive system with a lot of money shifting at any one time or whether to run a contestable system where an existing institution could retain a near monopoly and still be efficient.  Contestable markets theory was developed by William Baumol and gave confidence that dominant market institutions could be efficient when they faced the threat rather than the actuality of competition.  When Colin Webb joined FRST he quickly became familiar with the behavioural psychology and sociology of the science and later the tertiary education system.  He co-authored a fine paper on game theory with his predecessor in his role, Sean Devine. They applied the theory as it related to the behavioural incentives of the science providers.

In the post-World War Two period the universities became more active in basic research, some research associations grew, and some companies became significant players in advanced technological development.  For example, Fisher and Paykel Healthcare came into being in 1969 from collaboration between Dr Matt Spence, an Auckland hospital intensive care specialist, Alf Melville, a DSIR technician, and Dave O’Hare, a Fisher and Paykel engineer.  

From 1989 to 1992 the science reforms saw the separation between MoRST (policy), FRST (funding), and the undertaking of research.  DSIR and other government laboratories were established as CRIs. CRIs had to bid for funding from FRST, and this funding was allocated within MoRST’s broad science priorities.  FRST developed research strategies that created the link between the priority outcomes government sought and what the Foundation funded. 

Colin Webb was first and foremost a field scientist working in basic research. He was an international leader in evolutionary plant science.  Botany favoured outdoors-oriented, fit people who could tolerate the odd nasty insect sting in exotic places. Colin kept fit in the gym.  He drew very well, and his works included meticulous drawings of plants and seeds.

When I sought input into draft papers I’d written, I liked people to write their comments in red pen. Colin insisted on doing so in pencil and that was the end of the matter.

He was a master of recreational chess and of Go.   He showed how a poem or great prose was the best language to speak in difficult moments.  When he left Landcare, rather than give a farewell speech he read a poem.  When his close friend and research collaborator David Lloyd lay gravely ill Colin sat at his bedside reading him Frank Sargeson stories.  Matt McGlone introduced Colin to Flann O’Brien’s writings whenceforth the word spread, and among Colin’s literati friends no respectable personal library is absent a copy of The Third Policeman or At Swim-Two-Birds. 

As he eased into retirement Colin took up tramping and mountaineering in the Himalayas. There is something about mountains that turns the secular sacred and offers blessings for us merely mortal. 

He made friends with a sherpa, and deepened that friendship over a series of expeditions.  He got to know the wider community and financed generously the education of some poorer village children.  Eventually he was able to assist the sherpa, his wife and children to settle in New Zealand.

Colin lived multiple lives and few saw him from a 360 degree perspective.  I was a professional colleague, friend and wine tasting crony of Colin for many years without realising he shared my interest in chess and great literature.  In retrospect I am not surprised to learn of his interest in Go and in game theory.  Colin was like the W.D Hamilton of his branch of evolutionary botany.

FRST had an unusual governance system. Its empowering Act created its Board, not an organisation with a board.  This meant that the FRST’s Board was FRST and it had the decision rights.   The senior staff worked directly to the Board. This worked well because it reduced the information asymmetry between the Board and the bureaucracy. 

The Tertiary Education Advisory Commission (TEAC) was formed in 2000 to advise on tertiary education and this led to the Tertiary Education Commission (TEC). The TEC is a funder and responsible for shaping the system and implementing priorities.  As with FRST, the TEC was its board.  Colin was heavily involved in TEC’s design and establishment, and this reflected what he learnt in FRST.

Colin had deep concerns for the less well-off, without being performative or virtue signalling about it.  Like Cordelia he lacked the glib and oily art to speak and purpose not. From the beginning in TEC he saw adult literacy and numeracy problems as unacceptable barriers to participation in life.  He echoed those views in his farewell words from TEC.

At his funeral service, in accordance with Sherpa tradition, as the flower-laden coffin was placed in the hearse the only sound was silence.

Colin, you left us too early.  I’m sure you could have explained Finnegan’s Wake to me over a red wine.  And before you go I could open another bottle and you could guide me through Karl Friston’s free energy theory?  And that is all I can write through these tears.

The great soul of the Russian people will always outlive those who seek to destroy it

The Russian symbolist poet Osip Mandelstam once said that Russia is the only country that takes poetry seriously – it gets people killed.  In Stalin’s time some Russian poets were victimised and silenced, some were protected.  Stalin admired Pasternak’s translations of Georgian poetry into Russian.  He wrote a curt note to the NKVD telling it to “leave this cloud dweller alone.”

Russia’s Memorial organisation was established during the fall of the Soviet Union to study and commemorate human rights violations and other crimes committed by Stalin’s regime.  It was banned shortly before the invasion of Ukraine in early 2022.  Yet despite this, yesterday many Russians commemorated the victims of Stalinist terror through taking part in the Returning the Names event.  Every year, this event sees people taking turns reading out the names of people executed during Stalin’s Terror between 1936 and 1938. 

In Moscow, the event is traditionally held at the Solovetsky Stone memorial opposite the former KGB’s Lubyanka headquarters, now occupied by the FSB.  This year the authorities have banned the event from this location.

Osip Mandelstam’s Stalin Epigram  led to his arrest and death in custody.  Yet his contemporary, Anna Akhmatova, wrote of Russian poets and poetry that “our holy trade has existed for a thousand years.” Through all Russia’s troubles, brave and gifted Russian poets still write to “free language from the captivity of violence”. 

The great soul of the Russian people will always outlive those who seek to destroy it.

How to defend New Zealand without killing anyone (if possible)

War is older than all human cultures.  It pervades human history in all regions and epochs.  When the first oral histories were composed war was among the most pervasive themes.  Yet war is horrible.  It is also extremely expensive both for the “winners” and “losers”.  Sometimes it seems a fine hair trigger is tripped or mass psychosis arises from some flimsy pretext and otherwise rational people are sucked into it. 

New Zealand is now under pressure to join new alliances and spend more on defence without being told who the enemy might be.

New Zealand became an independent country from 4 February 1985 when David Lange banned nuclear-capable warships from New Zealand, against strong opposition from America, Britain and Australia.  The 1986 NZ Constitution Act conferred supreme power on our elected Parliament.  The Crown’s role was limited to the symbolic and procedural.  New Zealand had been decolonised!

In 2003, Helen Clark resisted pressures to join a US-led invasion of Iraq.  In contrast, Australia participated and was rewarded with trade advantages in the US market. We declined to value blood cheaper than gold.  We undertook peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts, albeit with mixed results.  Afghanistan is now under Taliban rule, and our SAS’s reputation is tarnished.

New Zealand has no territorial disputes with any other nation.  We are the most isolated and difficult to invade of all developed countries. 

New Zealand does face international challenges.  However, they are less daunting than those we faced from Japan in 1941-45, and from communist aggression on the Korean peninsula, in Malaysia and in Vietnam from the 1950s through to the Vietnam war ending in 1975. 

North Korea’s leadership has been unhinged for decades without causing us any trouble.  The major Asian powers such as China, Japan, South Korea and Indonesia are more stable and prosperous than ever. 

Why then is New Zealand contemplating increasing its defence expenditure and aligning more closely with US-led alliances aimed at “containing” China?  These alliances include AUKUS and “the Quad”, and they may be complemented with informal links with NATO.

AUKUS is a trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US,   announced in September 2021.  Under this pact, the US and the UK

will help transition Australia from its current diesel-electric submarines to Virginia class submarines and finally to SSN-AUKUS – Australian-built nuclear-powered submarines.  The Australian Navy would operate eight nuclear-powered submarines by the 2050s.  The programme’s total forecast costs range between A$268B to A$368B.  This is a huge financial risk because it assumes away advances in anti-submarine technologies that may make nuclear-powered submarines easier to detect and deal with.  It also carries the opportunity costs of alternative technologies that Australia may have invested in more productively.

The AUKUS pact also includes cooperation on advanced military capabilities including artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, hypersonics,  and electronic warfare capabilities.  New Zealand will not participate in nuclear-related AUKUS activities.  However, it should engage with advanced defence technologies under AUKUS Pillar Two.  This would help us stay in touch with leading edge technology, including to underpin possible entrepreneurial opportunities in civilian markets.

The Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is made up of India, Australia, Japan and the United States.  It began as a loose partnership to provide humanitarian assistance after the 2004 Indian ocean tsunami.  It was formalised in 2007 by the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, however it lay dormant amid concerns it could harm relations with China.  It was reactivated in 2017, with both the Trump and Biden administrations placing more focus on the Indo-Pacific region to counter China’s increasing assertiveness.

What are New Zealand’s given assumptions?

There are some broadly accepted given assumptions in New Zealand’s defence and security policy.  New Zealand and Australia are closely linked through history, economic and family ties.  So many New Zealanders live in Australia that an attack on Australia is an attack on New Zealand(ers). 

Given Australia’s importance to us we must offer a credible combat capability to help defend it on its own territory.  However, we have no obligations to engage in combat operations in, for example, the Middle East or the South China Sea.  The current Plan is to grow the New Zealand Defence Force by around 1500 service personnel.

The Australian and New Zealand armies are working together under the “Plan ANZAC” framework.  One outcome sought is that our army will be “capable of contributing a Motorised Infantry Battle Group in an Australian-led Brigade within an integrated ABCANZ (American, British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand) Division”.  The new personnel needed for this Battle Group have been budgeted for, with the Army’s size growing to 6000 personnel by 2035. 

There is emphasis on adopting Australian Army training doctrine.  New Zealand is also likely to adopt Australian combat equipment where it is effective and affordable, such as the Bushmaster armoured vehicle purchase.

Other givens include New Zealand’s membership in the “Five Eyes” intelligence gathering arrangements with America, Australia, Britain and Canada.  The $2.4B cost for the P-8A Poseidon aircraft is part of the price we pay for Five Eyes membership.  It is a good investment given the critical role intelligence plays.

Another given for New Zealand is our legal ban on nuclear weapons, and on nuclear-powered ships (including submarines) entering New Zealand waters.  This will come under attack and it needs to be defended with moral clarity and strategic acuity.  Specifically, our stance differentiates us from the nuclear powers in AUKUS and may give us an intermediator role with powers such as China.

Way forward for New Zealand

If we agree on the above “givens” for New Zealand, the way forward includes:

• Taking a wider (non-violent) view of different lines of defence
• Leveraging innovation in defence technology
• Using defence procurement to develop New Zealand industry

Different lines of defence

Combat operations must be a last resort and not the first line of defence.  Trade, student exchanges, international education, tourism, diplomacy, multi-national institutions, and international rules of law are the first defensive lines.  Global issues such as climate change and pandemics require international responses and countries such as China, the United States and India must engage cooperatively.

Trade is a positive not a zero-sum game.  However, America and China are competing over intellectual property, key technologies and the interpretation of international laws and rules.  From time-to-time New Zealand may offer a still, small voice of calm and respect for others that may tone down big power posturing.

Trade also makes countries dependent on each other in a healthy way.  The world semiconductor industry is dominated by Taiwan, and Taiwan’s industry is dependent on one company in Eindhoven in the Netherlands that supplies devices used in the industry.  Chinese action against Taiwan could do China a lot of economic damage through the disruption to its many industries that depend on semi-conductors.

Some international laws and institutions such as the WTO have strong deliberative and enforcement rules.  Politicians and other powerful people can also be called to account through other international mechanisms.  In 2012, the United States Congress passed the Magnitsky Act, which imposed sanctions on foreign individuals who have committed human rights abuses or been involved in significant corruption. 

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued warrants for the arrest of Vladimir Putin and one of his officials in relation to the forced deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia.  One might ask whether the ICC should have considered charging George W Bush and Tony Blair for their roles in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The second line of defence can be cultural, ranging from popular culture and its memes right through to the Abrahamic religions, and more liberal strands and spinoffs such as Quakerism and Baha’i.  We must keep cultural exchanges unimpeded by politics.  For example, Russian language is a world treasure and must not be weaponised or cancelled.

The New Zealand cartoonist David Low ridiculed Hitler in his cartoons and Charlie Chaplin also did so in his films.  These did not stop Hitler.  However, the American Government in 1941 sent Walt Disney on a goodwill tour of Latin American countries to successfully help counter Nazi influences.

The third line of defence includes social media, NGO and individual activism, investigative journalism such as Nicky Hager’s sterling work, and media-facing academic research, for example Anne-Marie Brady’s work on China’s use of “soft power”.

The Putin regime has actively used social media to back favoured politicians such as Trump, to promote separatist far right movements and generally to undermine democracy.  It can bring a state’s resources to bear and is difficult and dangerous to counter – key journalists and opposition politicians in Russia can end up dead.

The Netherlands-based Bellingcat journalism group specialises in investigating atrocities and human rights abuses using open-source intelligence, fact-checking and other techniques.  One key achievement was demonstrating that Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down on 17 July 2014 by a Russian Buk surface to air missile launcher that had been moved to occupied Ukraine to launch a missile and then returned to Russia.  A Dutch court convicted two Russians and a Ukrainian separatist for the murders.

A fourth line of non-lethal defence sits in a grey area between “cold” and “hot” war.  It potentially includes cyber “warfare”, and bloodless interventions in communications, infrastructure, and key “pinch points” in a target country’s supply chain or production or innovation systems.  For example, in 2010 the Stuxnet computer malware did a lot of damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities and slowed its nuclear programme. 

Leveraging innovation in defence technology

Over the last forty or so years low-cost weapons have been able to inflict disproportionate losses on high-cost combat systems.   Precision targeting is cost effective as well as lethal.  Shoulder-launched Stinger missiles proved devastating against the Soviet air force in Afghanistan.   The Falkland’s war showed how vulnerable large, high-cost warships were to subsonic, low cost anti-ship missiles.

The Ukraine war has unleashed innovation that integrates understanding of problems to solve, design of solutions, and manufacture and delivery of them.  Most of the innovations use information technology, often to repurpose existing equipment. 

Drone technology enables fast-moving innovation such as combat drones being developed from non-military models.   Software used in readily available tablets and smartphones can be converted into sophisticated targeting tools.  Simple 3D printers can make spare parts to repair heavy equipment in the field.  Technicians can convert pickup trucks into missile launchers.

Ukraine has developed a whole new weapon system: surface and submarine maritime drones.  These range from weaponised jet skis to quite large drone submarines.  The combined effect of these drones and of air launched cruise missiles has been to render much of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea irrelevant.

Ukrainian sources suggest that <10% of tanks destroyed are hit by opposing tanks – 90% are destroyed by drones, mines, anti-tank missiles or artillery.  A single American-made F-35 can cost $100M, and so much depends on how effective its stealth and other survival properties will be over the longer term.

Emerging technologies such as rail guns and high energy lasers may change defence and its economics fundamentally.  This reinforces the case to engage with AUKUS Pillar Two to stay abreast of technological change.

Using defence procurement to develop New Zealand industry

New Zealand could use its defence and security investment to grow more knowledge intensive businesses and lift New Zealand’s productivity.  For New Zealand businesses to succeed in defence or dual-purpose technologies requires several conditions to be met.  There must be a clear understanding of the problem and how it can be addressed.  The business needs a strong design capability.  It does not need to manufacture complex parts so long as it controls the core design and build functions – and knows where all the complex parts fit.

It makes sense for New Zealand to invest more in dual-purpose technology that serves both civil and security and defence markets.   Examples might relate to drones used for environmental monitoring, search and rescue, and fisheries protection.  Such drones could be repurposed for combat roles in an exigency.

The Australian firm Sypaq, an engineering and solutions company, created the Corvo Precision Payload Delivery System (PPDS) for use in asset inspection, search and rescue, border security, emergency services, law enforcement, food security as well as military purposes.

The Corvo drone is made of waxed cardboard and comes as a fold-out flatpack.  It is difficult to detect with radar and it can deliver a 5kg payload 120km.  It costs around US$3,500 and has already hit high-cost Russian targets such as jet aircraft on the ground, and surface to air missile systems.

There are some interesting businesses in New Zealand that largely serve the civil, non-military markets but have military or security niches.   HamiltonJet makes patrol craft water jet propulsion systems.   Rocket Lab makes New Zealand one of a small number of countries that launches satellites. 

We have some innovative emerging companies.  Kea Aerospace is working on stratospheric aviation that can facilitate data acquisition and communications for environmental monitoring, precision agriculture, disaster management and maritime domain awareness.   Dawn Aerospace is pioneering space plane technology.

Learning may be drawn from international work in such fields.  BAE Systems has designed a lightweight solar-powered Unmanned Aerial System that can stay aloft for weeks or months and fulfil at lower cost the imagery and communications function that satellites and conventional aircraft currently provide.  This is the level of technological ambition that New Zealand could aspire to, drawing on for example light weight construction materials and aerodynamic knowledge built up in competitive yacht racing and in businesses such as Rocket Lab.

Small UAVs with both civil and military applications have been developed in New Zealand at a fraction of the cost of overseas equivalents.   It is understood that the New Zealand Konihi can be built for around $5000 – much cheaper than the $85,000 for the American Dragon Eye system.

New Zealand is on the cusp of investing billions of dollars on military equipment that will determine for decades ahead what we can and cannot do militarily, in disaster relief, Antarctic operations, hydrography, resource protection and other civil as well as military functions. 

The Defence Capability Plan 2019 envisaged a decision being made by 2028 for the replacement of the Protector class Offshore Patrol Vessels, with the Anzac frigates being replaced in the 2030s “with modern surface combatants relevant to New Zealand’s prevailing strategic environment.”

In 2023 the Government published New Zealand’s inaugural National Security Strategy, Policy and Strategy Statement, and the Future Force Design Principles that set the scene for the reconfiguration of the country’s combat capabilities.  The Statement focuses on the Pacific, however it anticipates contributing globally to collective security efforts.  This seems rather ill-defined and unbounded.

For the air force the “big ticket” P-8A Poseidon purchase has been made and the existing C-130H Hercules will be replaced by a new fleet of Hercules C-130 (J) in 2024. 

Except for the ice-strengthened naval tanker and support ship HMNZS Aotearoa, all ships in our existing fleet will reach the end of their economical service life in the mid-2030s.  Around $5-8B of new naval capital investment may be committed from now to the 2030s.   Examples include around $1B to replace maritime helicopters, up to $600M to $1B to replace the two Offshore Patrol Vessels with ships better suited to difficult maritime environments, and at least $3B to replace two frigates.  Other investments include a second sealift vessel to complement the HMNZS Canterbury.

In my view New Zealand should not replace the current frigates and their helicopters with more modern versions.  Even the most sophisticated warships are too vulnerable to attack from UAVs, stealth missiles and hypersonic missiles.  

The Navy should be made up of logistic support ships and long-range offshore patrol ships suited to New Zealand’s difficult conditions.  As one example, the Castle class patrol ship used by the Royal Navy at the time of the Falklands war had a terrific range (10,000nm) and far better seakeeping qualities than patrol vessels that New Zealand sailors have had to put up with.

The ice-capable Danish Thetis class patrol vessel would be much cheaper than a frigate designed for front-line combat operations as part of a US carrier-led operation.  The Thetis class is capable enough to replace both the ANZACs and the Protector class Offshore Patrol Vessels.  A successor ship type, the MPV 80 class, is being planned to carry out civilian as well as military functions.  Compared to new combat frigate purchases, the ocean patrol vessel option could free up hundreds of millions of dollars to invest in other technologies such as UAVs.

New Zealand should deliberately configure its armed forces to make it difficult for them to integrate into confrontational multi-lateral operations outside our region.  The average cruising speed of an American carrier fleet is between 20 to 30 knots, and so offshore patrol ships would not be able to keep up with such a fleet in fast moving operations.

A much higher proportion of New Zealand’s defence budget could be spent domestically or in Australia.   The Australian government has signalled interest in developing Australia’s own arms industries, with emphasis including missile manufacturing.  New Zealand could invest in skill development in fields such as design, AI, imaging, 3D engineering, and aerospace and marine precision engineering.   Some of these are enabling technologies that can deliver wider spill-over benefits. 

New Zealand’s Defence Assessment 2021 had concluded that the two principal challenges to New Zealand’s defence interests are strategic competition and the impacts of climate change.   “Strategic competition” (uncoded) means competition between an increasingly assertive China and incumbent power(s), notably the United States.   At worst this can create a “Thucydides trap” (Allison 2017) that turns into a “hot war” we want no part of. 

New Zealand should not buy into America’s characterisation of China as an expansionist power that must be contained.  Since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms from the late 1970s, China has lifted hundreds of millions of its people out of poverty.  Its trade and investment performance has lifted living standards in many countries, including New Zealand. 

However, we should not see China as an economic saviour.  China may lose its relative dominance among the Asian economies.  It faces demographic decline, natural resource limitations, and macroeconomic imbalances associated with its high savings rates and low consumption.  Its autocratic leadership system has few checks and balances, political and economic power are conflated, and regulatory settings may dampen private sector entrepreneurship.

India is now more populous than China and it is developing strategically important industries, including defence.  Like India, Indonesia has many of the preconditions for sustained economic growth and therefore market diversification opportunities for countries such as New Zealand.

Under all scenarios New Zealand should deepen its relationship with Australia.  We should reaffirm our commitment to liberal democracy, which is being eroded in New Zealand.  Our defence investment should be more focused on supporting New Zealand’s technology-intensive industrial development.  This will often be done jointly with Australia.  However, in defence matters we must also be prepared to exercise our sovereign self-determination rights, including from time-to-time the right to say no.

References and other reading

Allison, G. 2017: Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Houghton Mifflin.

DPMC, National Security Group 2023: Aotearoa’s National Security Strategy: Secure together .

New Zealand Security Intelligence Service 2023: New Zealand’s security threat environment 2023.  An Assessment by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.

New Zealand Ministry of Defence 2023.  Defence Policy Review: Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023.

Will New Zealand’s liberal democracy survive?

New Zealand’s democracy based on equal voting rights is changing with different rights assigned at birth, based on whether you have Māori blood or not.  New Māori-only rights exist or are being put in place in the environmental, resource management, education, health, science, local government, and other sectors.  Resources are therefore allocated based on race rather than on need

Race-based rights are increasingly enabled in legislation, promoted by Labour Government politicians, academics, public servants in key positions, and supported by most mainstream media.  Opposing voices are silenced through publication bans, disruption of meetings, threats to careers, and Orwellian racism accusations.

A strategy to weaken New Zealand’s democracy involves attacking its foundations. These are the electoral system itself, Parliamentary processes, the education system, the science system, and the rule of law.  The Labour Government has progressed fundamental constitutional reforms in secret, for example the He Puapua report (Charters et al 2019).  It assured the public this work was on hold even while it was still energetically progressing it.  This suggests contempt for open government and meaningful consultative processes. 

Scrutiny of legislation– one of Parliament’s core roles – has at times been derisory.  For example, on 28 August 2023 the Government proceeded with the Electoral (Lowering Voting Age for Local Elections and Polls) Bill.  This establishes a new category of electors, named ‘youth electors’, and makes way for 16-year-olds and 17-year-olds to be registered on a youth electoral roll to vote in council elections.  It was given only a few seconds of time for the title to be read out in Parliament and the Bill tabled!

The compulsory school history curriculum teaches a partial view of New Zealand history.  Colonisation is demonised almost exclusively, despite its many benefits.  New Zealand’s achievement as one of the most socially progressive and economically successful small democracies is not celebrated.  The New Zealand Wars are covered, however the most violent chapter in our history – the Musket Wars from about 1807 to 1838 is largely ignored.

The inclusion of  mātauranga  Māori (Māori “ways of knowing”) in the school science curriculum, and giving it equal status with international science, will weaken our science education and turn many students off science.  Significant science research funding is now based on whether researchers have Māori ancestry and/or have committed to mātauranga Māori”.  These “ways of knowing” (or rather believing) may have little scientific content that would be recognised internationally.  As a result, New Zealand science has become subject to sceptical international scrutiny and some ridicule.  Some of New Zealand’s greatest scientists and technologists such as Garth Cooper and Ross Ihaka are Māori.  Had they studied mātauranga Māori rather than international science, New Zealand and the world would be much the poorer.

Much of the race-related debate has focused on “co-governance”, which is not well defined.  Co-governance can encourage subsidiarity – that is delegating decision rights to those closer to the action and to where the results fall.  For example, a “wrap around” whanau ora initiative can see effective service delivery through co-governance involving government agencies and iwi.  However, co-governance can also involve parallel government and legal systems and separate institutions that divide the community. 

Co-governance in the Water Services Entities Act 2022 and the Water Services Amendment Bills, and in the Natural and Built Environment 2023 are racialist.  In the Water Services legislation, the governance system and a requirement to give effect to Te Mana o te Wai statementsgive iwi and hapū effective control over New Zealand’s water resources.

The Natural and Built Environment Act includes regional planning committees with Māori members appointed by iwi and hapū groups, a National Māori Entity, and requirements for anyone exercising powers, functions, or duties under the Act to give effect to the principles of te Tiriti (despite the fact that there are no principles in te Tiriti.)

Laws are rules which must be obeyed by all, and the law binds the Crown.  

In New Zealand the Fitzgerald v Muldoon case in 1976 saw a junior public servant (Paul Fitzgerald) challenge the legality of Prime Minister Robert Muldoon abolishing a superannuation scheme put in place by the previous Labour Government.  Fitzgerald’s challenge was upheld by the judgment of Chief Justice Sir Richard Wild.  The law bound the Crown and the rule of law prevailed.  However, in July 2023 the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) abolished its Rule of Law Committee.  This suggests that the rule of law will in time be weakened.

One form of attack on our democracy is to effectively call the New Zealand government or even the nation unlawful or illegitimate. 

The Waitangi Tribunal’s 2014 report into the first stage of its WAI 1040 northern Māori inquiry claimed that Māori did not cede sovereignty: “We have concluded that in February 1840 the rangatira who signed te Tiriti did not cede their sovereignty.  Rather, they agreed to share power and authority with the Governor.”  This “big lie” that never dies despite overwhelming evidence against it, raises serious consequences.  It gifts a moral licence to any criminal to argue that they broke no legitimate law.   In extremis, it may spark or psychologically enable “sovereign citizen” movements, white supremacists, far-right Māori nationalists and entitled tribalists.

In a 2019 paper “The elephant in the courtroom: An Essay on the Judiciary’s Silence on the Legitimacy of the New Zealand State” Dr Claire Charters accused the judiciary of “silently upholding the myth of the legitimacy of the state”.  

I stress that Claire Charters is intelligent, multi-lingual and malice-free – she is not one of what Helen Clark termed the “haters and wreckers” within Māoridom.  I’m sure that Dr Charters is aware that very few countries would put up with their judiciaries challenging the state’s right to exist!  

Taking a more oblique line, Dr Charters has argued that court recognition of tikanga implicitly signals that Crown sovereignty is not absolute.  However, since Magna Carta and the development of English common law Crown sovereignty has never been absolute. 

In pre-European times, warring Māori tribes owed obligations not to a state and its laws but to kinship and custom (tikanga).  However, without a written language, Māori customs and social rules could not be formalized as written statutes or common law.  Tikanga disappeared when it lost relevance or acceptability – cannibalism is an example.  Some other tikanga such as rahui retain wide support, though may be difficult to enforce.  Much tikanga is limited to traditional Māori cultural settings.

In a 2017 paper titled ‘Use It or Lose It: The Value of Using the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Māori Political and Legal Claims’ Dr Charters argues: 

“The value of using international norms as a means to increase their compliance pull on states over time, even when they may be resistant to the norms or the norms are not binding, is supported by theories on constructivism, transnational legal process theory and social movement theory. At heart, these theories share the proposition that there are methods to embed norms in the domestic and legal landscape in such a way that states view conformity with them as ordinary and rationally-appropriate behaviour or, conversely, contravention as politically and legally illegitimate.

This sounds noble.  However it could be interpreted as a strategy to advance elite interests in a roundabout way.  This paper was published in 2017 and foreshadows the He Puapua report two years later. 

The thinking in He Puapua hearkens back to the times of aristocratic tribal elitism in Europe and in New Zealand.  It brings to mind the work of Carl Schmitt in Germany who undermined the Weimar Republic and made possible its overthrow.  He Puapua has within it some traces of fascist thinking.

What New Zealand needs is whakakotahitanga (unity) on such core principles as equal citizenship rights and the rule of law, while fostering the diversity that comes from multi-culturalism and individualism.  This unity amidst diversity has socio-economic and equity implications.  Without productivity growth there is neither prosperity nor social mobility, and without these our democratic foundations become shaky and perhaps the state’s legitimacy will continue to be questioned. 

New Zealanders will not over the long term accept being assigned to racial categories with different rights fixed at birth.  You can already see this in the reaction to race-based surgical prioritisation, and to the burning of huts in what was once an iconic Urewera National Park that belonged to all, not to the Crown or a tribe. 

It is within our power to strengthen democracy while becoming a higher productivity and more equitable economy.  After all, te Tiriti is colour-blind and the Crown commits to equal rights for all New Zealanders: – “nga tangata maori katoa o Nu Tirani.”

Perhaps some spindrift could be gathered from He Puapua’s breaking wave and be shaped into something unifying in the spirit of whakakotahitanga and of Leucothea (the Greek goddess of spindrift).  Maybe a team of Claire Charters, David Seymour, Chris Trotter and a hard-headed economist such as Bryce Wilkinson might be charged with this most difficult and most valuable task?

References

Charters et al, 2019: He Puapua.  Report of the working group on a plan to realise the UN Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples in Aotearoa New Zealand.Wellington, TPK.

Charters, C: 2019: ‘The Elephant in the Court Room: An Essay on the Judiciary’s Silence on the Legitimacy of the New Zealand State.’  In: Max Harris and Simon Mount (eds) The Promise of Law: Essays marking the retirement of Dame Sian Elias as Chief Justice of New Zealand (Auckland, Lexis Nexis, 2019).

Charters, C. 2017: ‘Use It or Lose It: The Value of Using the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Maori Political and Legal Claims’. Forthcoming, International Indigenous Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand.

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Resolving arguments about opening meetings with karakia: A modest proposal

Debate continues on whether meetings should open with a karakia, and if so what rules might apply.  Some oppose their purported religious content (karakia can be secular).  Some argue karakia must always be translated into English.  Others value Te Reo Māori for its emotional power, its meanings ineffable in English, or simply because of how it sounds.

Meetings take up a large part of working life and how they are run has a big impact on outcomes.  Formal meetings can begin with individuals arriving with fixed views they wish to impose on people they have never met, listened to, or learnt from.  Such meetings often get off to a bad start and deliver poor outcomes because the social foundations are not in place and the right spirit does not prevail.  

Most work-related meetings are transactional and focus on information-sharing, decision-making and agreed action points.  Karakia are not appropriate for such meetings.  Karakia are best suited to important formal meetings on weighty issues where relationships matter and enduring change is sought.

I believe that beginning a meeting with a karakia fosters respect, calm, shared purpose, and improves the chances of good outcomes.  Like an All Black haka they can be both “a cultural product” and have a practical purpose (warming up).  They are a low-key way of improving Māori language visibility while helping improve meeting outcomes.

However, if we support human universality, bicultural English and Māori should not crowd out all other cultures in New Zealand.  My modest proposal is that important, consequentialist meetings should begin with karakia or with any song, incantation or other artistic product in any language that can fulfill the same role as a karakia.  There is no inherent need for the language to be translated – the greatest human artistic achievements translate themselves through the emotions they evoke.

Some illustrative examples that transcend cultures and combine high artistic achievement and positive humanism are suggested below:

YO YO MA & ITZHAK PERLMAN PLAY DVORAK

Dvorak was a Czech composer, YoYo Ma is Chinese-American and Itzhak Perlman is Israeli-American.  Look at the rapport between these two great musicians.

Oh it is not yet evening.  Russian folk song

Look at the cue exchange and prompting between the singers, and the bond between the accordionist and the lead singer.  And look at the delight shared when they have finished a song sung with emotional power!

Offering Chant sung by Lama Gyurme with Jean-Philippe Rykiel on piano  

A Tibetan singer with a French pianist.  Let’s hope that such a Tibetan taonga is not threatened by cultural homogenization.

IEVAN POLKKA by LOITUMA

A beautiful Finnish cappella that is almost beyond translation.

Carol of the bells

A Ukrainian piece that all sheep farming peoples can identify with!

You tricked me

This is a Ukrainian joke song, also popular in Russia.  Without knowing a word of Russian or Ukrainian you can tell the lady is in control of the line of suitors for her hand.

 Lorde & Marlon Williams – Mata Kohoto (Stoned at The Nail Salon) Live @ Alexandra Palace London

Bicultural New Zealand at its artistic best!

Caucasian Cossack dance

An authentic performance of a famous Cossack dance song.

Sonnet 30, set to music in a New York street scene

Sonnet 30 from the supreme universal genius who no one has yet been able to cancel…